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Corruption has wide-ranging corrosive effects, 
from undermining democracy and the rule of law, 
to providing the fertile ground in which organised 
crime and terrorism flourish.1 It takes many forms, 
from bribery to extortion, cronyism to nepotism, and 
patronage to embezzlement.2 
In South Africa corruption is defined in the Prevention 
and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004 
(Act 12 of 2004) as ‘giving or offering to give, of a 
benefit that is not legally due to a person vested 
with the duty by virtue of his or her office, with the 
intention of influencing him or her to do something, 
or not to do something in the performance of that 
duty’.3 But most South Africans interpret corruption 
more broadly to include abuse of resources, 
maladministration, theft and fraud.4 
Because both parties involved in corrupt transactions 
benefit from them, corruption is always difficult to 
measure. And as South Africa does not have a 
single database of corruption reports, it is particularly 
difficult to gauge its prevalence here. To do so, we 
have to draw on a range of disparate sources.
For example, the Transparency International Global 
Corruption Barometer 20135 showed that 54% of 
respondents felt that corruption in South African 
businesses had increased substantially over the 
preceding year. In addition, in the 2013 Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index,6 South 
Africa was the 72nd most corrupt of 175 countries 
measured. The 2013–2014 National Victims of Crime 
Survey showed that 37.9% of households reported 
being asked to pay a bribe in return for services from 
government officials. It also showed that 70% of 
respondents believed that corruption had increased 
during the period 2010–2013.7  
Every year Corruption Watch, a non-profit 
organisation, receives thousands of allegations 
of corruption from the public, as does the Public 
Service Commission’s National Anti-Corruption 
Hotline (NACH). Calls to the latter are routed to a 
Case Management Centre from where they are 
referred to relevant government departments. 
Departments must in turn investigate allegations and 
report back to the hotline. 
Corruption causes substantial social and economic harm. The South African government’s attempts to combat 
corruption have relied on strengthening legislation, introducing statutory investigative bodies, initiating public 
anti-corruption campaigns, and appealing to the integrity of individuals. Yet corruption remains a big problem in 
South Africa. However, one approach that has yet to be pursued is intelligence-led policing (ILP). ILP is a model 
built around proactive risk assessment and risk management. This article explains how ILP can be used to 
investigate corruption in South Africa.  
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Table 1: Fraud and bribery 
Risk associated with 
fraud and bribery
Possible control 
weaknesses
Officials claiming overtime 
without rendering any 
activities
•	 Supervisory	checks	not	
done 
•	 Lack	of	overtime	
recording system
Officials claiming a 
subsistence allowance on 
unauthorised trips, or trips 
not undertaken 
•	 Lack	of	systems	to	
verify attendance of 
trips
•	 Circumvention	of	
delegation of authority 
Officials receiving 
kickbacks from members 
of the public in order 
to obtain government 
tenders  
•	 Lack	of	declaration	of	
interest procedures
•	 Lack	of	policy	in	
accepting gifts
Traffic officials receiving 
bribes from motorists, 
or public service officials  
receiving bribes to speed 
up enquiries in order to 
prevent delays 
•	 Lack	of	awareness	
campaigns to members 
of the public on anti-
bribery measures
•	 Lack	of	enforcement	
of internal disciplinary 
measures against the 
perpetrators
Officials demanding bribes 
in order to issue illegal 
drivers’ licences and 
roadworthy certificates
•	 No	supervisory	checks
•	 Sharing	of	access	
controls to circumvent 
segregation of duties
Prison warders accepting 
bribes in order to help 
inmates escape from 
prison
•	 Lack	of	detection	
controls
•	 Lack	of	access	controls
Members of the public 
offering bribes to officials 
in return for obtaining 
tender contracts
•	 Lack	of	enforcement	
of internal disciplinary 
measures against 
procurement officials 
Private individuals 
resorting to collusive 
tendering to fix prices and 
limit competiveness 
•	 Lack	of	blacklisting	
mechanisms in the 
public sector 
Adjudication of tenders is 
often irregular, with correct 
procedures ignored
Tender specifications are 
ignored or modified to suit 
a prospective tenderer 
with a view to facilitating 
the tenderer’s success in 
the tender process   
•	 Lack	of	visible	
prosecution of 
companies involved 
in corrupt practices in 
the same manner and 
to the same degree as 
the officials involved in 
corrupt activities 
Source: Public Service Commission, Profiling and analysis 
of the most common manifestations of corruption and its 
related risks in the public service, 2010
Similarly, between 2004 and 2012, the Special 
Investigating Unit (SIU), responsible for recovering 
and preventing state losses caused by corruption, 
fraud and maladministration, prepared evidence 
for 26 798 criminal cases. It also initiated 31 216 
disciplinary hearings and 568 967 other remedial 
actions, such as the cancellation of fraudulent 
drivers’ licences and recommendations on the 
removal of social grants from the social pension 
system.8 
The Public Service Commission9 (PSC) and the 
Gauteng Anti-Corruption Strategic Framework10 
offer other examples of how corruption manifests in 
South Africa. The PSC report cites fraud and bribery 
as the most common types of corruption allegations 
received at the NACH since its inception. 
Other examples suggested by the PSC are reflected 
in Table 1.
All of the examples listed in this section provide 
some, albeit fractured, insight into the state of 
corruption in South Africa. But is enough being done 
to address the corruption that is uncovered? This is 
discussed in the next section.
Intelligence-led policing
It would seem that most of South Africa’s anti-
corruption efforts are reactive. Both industry and 
statutory bodies rely on whistle-blowing hotlines 
and internal audits to expose corruption, but the 
data collected by these bodies is not synthesised. 
In other words, it makes little contribution to crime 
intelligence or to efforts to predict and forestall 
corrupt acts. Considering the ongoing challenges 
posed by corrupt activities, it is important that 
alternative methods be considered. One such 
method is intelligence-led policing (ILP). 
ILP is a conceptual framework for conducting 
the business of policing. It is built around risk 
assessment and risk management.11 ILP is an 
information-organising process that allows policing 
agencies to better understand their crime problems, 
thus enabling them to make informed decisions on 
how best to approach specific crime challenges.12 
Contrary to what its name may suggest, ILP does 
not imply clandestine and covert activity conducted 
by shady officers. Rather, it is a business process 
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model that determines where resources are needed, 
facilitates the organisation of knowledge, coordinates 
activity and allows lessons to be learnt from that 
activity.13  
The paradigm of ILP is interpreted differently in 
different jurisdictions, resulting in variations in the ILP 
model. For example, the UK’s National Intelligence 
Model (NIM) operates at three different levels. Level 
one deals with crime incidents and neighbourhood 
priorities occurring at a Basic Command Unit (BCU) 
level, while level two deals with cross-border issues 
affecting more than one BCU, neighbouring forces, 
and regional crime activity. Level three deals with 
serious and organised crime that operates on a 
national and international scale.14 In South Africa, the 
South African Police Service (SAPS) model comprises 
11 steps and is premised on the collection, analysis, 
coordination and dissemination of crime intelligence 
for tactical, operational and strategic use.15 The 
steps can be utilised at station, provincial or national 
level. A single analytical division exists in the SAPS 
model, but it is not entrusted with all of the available 
information for purposes of analysis.16 
The NIM and the SAPS models allow for the 
analytical function to be performed at different 
levels. But would a single analytical division, which 
disseminates tactical, operational and strategic 
corruption intelligence to policing agencies, not 
be better than these approaches? The 3i model 
proposed by Ratcliffe17 offers such a framework. 
As illustrated below, the 3i model compels close 
cooperation between police chiefs, managers and 
intelligence analysts in order to facilitate strategies 
that have an impact on the criminal environment.18
Figure 1: The 3i model 
  
Source: JH Ratcliffe, The structure of strategic thinking, 
Sydney: Federation Press, 2009
The model requires criminal intelligence analysis to 
actively interpret the criminal environment. The 3i, a 
reference to ‘interpret’, ‘influence’ and ‘impact’, is 
a ‘simple description of what can be a much more 
complex process’.19 Ratcliffe uses the 3i model as 
a conceptual sketch of the role of intelligence and 
decision makers in ILP. The model entails intelligence 
units actively interpreting the criminal environment 
and using the intelligence to influence law-
enforcement decision makers, who in turn use the 
intelligence product to design strategies that have an 
impact on the criminal environment.20 The model is 
based on three focal points: the criminal environment, 
intelligence analysis and decision-making. These are 
discussed in more detail below.
The criminal environment
The criminal environment in corruption cases 
encompasses a plethora of information, including 
raw data, knowledge, patterns, instructions and 
understanding. Analysts target this environment 
to collect information from public and private 
sources. Information collection may include entering 
into memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with 
business and government departments. Received 
information is channelled to a monitoring and 
analysis department responsible for reading, 
capturing, assessing and analysing the information. In 
corruption cases, information collected might include 
bank statements, e-mails, Internet and telephone 
communications, gambling records, VAT registration 
documents, insurance policy details and criminal 
records. Analysts must actively canvass intelligence 
from different sources in the criminal environment and 
make every effort to acquire the information required 
by interviewing investigating officers and, if possible, 
debriefing handlers of confidential information.21 
Crime intelligence analysis
Once information is collected, it needs to be 
interpreted and converted into intelligence by 
analysts. In corruption cases, analysts use 
intelligence analysis, investigative analysis, 
geographic analysis, crime threat analysis, crime 
pattern analysis and charting techniques. 
Examples of charting techniques used by 
analysts include:22 
Criminal 
environment
Decision 
maker
Intelligence 
analysis
impactinterpret
influence
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•	 Link	charting:	to	show	relationships	among	entities,	
for example between the corrupter and corruptee
•	 Event	charting:	to	show	chronological	relationships	
among entities or sequences of events
•	 Commodity	flow	charting:	to	explore	the	movement	
of money and stolen goods
•	 Activity	charting:	to	identify	activities	involved	in	a	
criminal operation
•	 Financial	profiling:	to	identify	concealed	income	
of individuals or business entities and to identify 
indicators of economic crime
•	 Frequency	charting:	to	organise,	summarise	and	
interpret quantitative information
•	 Data	correlation:	to	illustrate	relationships	between	
different variables
The intelligence analysis of information on corruption 
is performed in fusion centres. Fusion centres are 
the ‘heart beat’ of the model, where all information is 
collated and analysed. Fusion centres are designed 
to blend information from a variety of sources.23 Their 
success depends on agencies changing policies and 
procedures that obstruct information and intelligence. 
They work to move beyond a reliance on information 
from police.24 There is an inherent requirement on the 
analyst to ‘actively interpret the criminal environment 
rather than to wait to receive intelligence’.25 The ILP 
model also offers a techno-savvy response to techno-
savvy crime, through its use of fusion centres. Armed 
with sophisticated information technology software, 
analysts are able to observe and understand crime 
threats across jurisdictions, consider how these 
may relate to one another, and develop means 
to proactively address them.26 The creation of 
such centres in South Africa would contribute to 
understanding and preventing corruption.
Decision-making
In the 3i model, crime intelligence analysis is linked to 
decision-making. Intelligence must inform decisions. 
For example, in the case of counterfeit card fraud 
(skimming), affected private industry can assist in 
identifying hotspots through an analysis of their own 
victimisation. This intelligence can be made available 
to the SAPS by bodies such as the South African 
Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC). Private 
analysts could form part of a multi-disciplinary team 
assisting the police. Such analysts could inform 
law-enforcement responses by providing relevant 
and timely information, and presenting professional 
reports and presentations containing logical 
arguments and factual intelligence.
By informing decision makers, analysts empower 
them to use the intelligence to make tactical, 
operational or strategic decisions to address 
crime.27 It has, however, been argued that the SAPS 
does not fully understand the importance and value 
of creating multi-disciplinary task teams. This is 
attributed to its bureaucratic nature.28 The SAPS 
is characterised by formal hierarchical structures 
with many different departments, operational 
rules and regulations, all of which are intended to 
ensure compliance by its staff. But this hinders 
collaboration between SAPS units and public and 
private institutions at large.   
The need for ILP in 
combating corruption
One reason for the emergence of ILP has been the 
inability of traditional policing methods to cope with 
the globalisation of crime, such as the emergence 
of transnational organised crime (TOC).29 Corruption 
is often intertwined with TOC and, in many cases, 
is the catalyst that breeds and sustains it.30 In 
an attempt to combat TOC, agencies such as 
Europol have adopted the ILP approach, resulting 
in successful transnational policing initiatives such 
as ‘Operation Godfather’. This involved cooperation 
between agencies from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Romania and Sweden, and resulted 
in the disruption of a criminal gang manufacturing 
skimming devices in Romania.31 The success of 
the operation relied on coordination from a single 
Europol centre where information was collected, 
exchanged, analysed and interpreted, leading to 
suspects being identified.  
In South Africa ILP exists to an extent in both the 
public and private sectors. The most prominent 
examples include the Financial Intelligence Centre 
(FIC) and SABRIC. Based on the 3i model, both 
institutions are involved in information collection, 
analysis and the converting of information into 
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intelligence. The FIC is staffed with 57 analysts32 
while the commercial crimes desk at SABRIC has 
six analysts.33 Working in fusion centres, analysts 
operate sophisticated IT software to understand and 
interpret crime information, map crime, and analyse 
its patterns. The shortcoming in South Africa is in 
the ‘decision-making’ node. In the FIC, the type of 
intelligence generated determines the nodal point 
to which information is disseminated. The reports 
may be forwarded to either the National Intelligence 
Co-coordinating Committee or the Justice, Crime 
Prevention and Security Cluster, which is made 
up of the SAPS, the Asset Forfeiture Unit, the 
Anti-Corruption Task Team and the South African 
Revenue Service. But the decision on whether to 
act on the intelligence and to furnish feedback to 
the FIC is at the discretion of the respective bodies. 
The FIC has no impact on their decisions.34 
In some instances SABRIC identifies threats and 
passes its reports directly to the SAPS. A 2004 
MoU between the SAPS and SABRIC provides for 
standard operating procedures relating to threats 
posed by syndicates and crimes that affect the 
banking industry. Responses combine members of 
specialised units within both the SAPS and SABRIC. 
SABRIC provides skilled analysts, computer 
hardware and software programmes, and office 
space, while SAPS investigators investigate, search, 
seize and arrest perpetrators. The MoU provides for 
secondments and co-location of personnel, allowing 
for sharing of skills, experience and specialist 
knowledge enabling, as envisaged in the 3i model.35
The success of the 3i model has been highlighted 
in various criminal cases in South Africa. The SAPS 
Sandton case,36 which saw joint collaboration 
between the SAPS and SABRIC, resulted in 
the conviction of seven syndicate members for 
counterfeit card fraud. This form of collaboration 
exists through authority derived from statutory and 
case laws, for example State v Botha and other,37 
State v Dube38 and section 179 of the constitution.39 
In State v Botha and other,40 the court ruled that 
it was not improper that a corporation’s internal 
investigation unit had conducted an investigation 
regarding the alleged defrauding of its pension fund. 
The court referred to the fact that various institutions 
conduct their own investigations and then hand 
over the evidence collected to the police for 
prosecution. Similarly, in State v Dube,41 a private 
investigator set a trap for an employee of a vehicle 
manufacturer who was suspected of being involved 
in theft. The investigator arranged for meetings 
so that the suspect could be photographed and 
audio recorded. The High Court expressed its 
acceptance that private investigations occur, and 
that the evidence collected is handed over to the 
police for prosecution.
Corruption intelligence centre
Chapter 14 in the National Development Plan lists 
fighting corruption as one of the state’s key goals. 
To this end, efforts to eradicate corruption need to 
include private and public sector partnerships to 
sustain anti-corruption initiatives on all fronts. It is 
against this backdrop that a corruption intelligence 
centre (CIC) should be established in line with 
the 3i model. I believe that the centre should 
comprise a crime/corruption information hub (fusion 
centre) that receives information from all possible 
sources. This can then be centrally analysed and 
disseminated to relevant enforcement agencies.
A single fusion centre such as the CIC will 
provide the relevant institutional support currently 
lacking in anti-corruption agencies. The CIC will 
not amount to a single ‘anti-corruption agency’ 
since it will be primarily involved in collecting 
information rather than investigating or prosecuting 
offenders, and will provide support to prominent 
corruption combatting bodies like the SIU and 
the SAPS. It will be important that analysts are 
able to influence decision makers to act on the 
information/intelligence furnished. Intelligence 
gathering must be performed by adhering to the 
legislative mandate specific to section 199 of the 
constitution, the National Strategic Intelligence Act 
and the Intelligence Oversight Act 1994 (Act 40 of 
1994). Secondments of personnel who are legally 
mandated to collect intelligence will avoid any 
contraventions to any act, provided the intelligence 
is collected legally. 
Conclusion
Corruption remains a serious challenge to 
prosperity, governance, law and order in South 
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Africa. To combat corruption, law enforcement 
authorities must work ‘smarter’. This can 
be achieved by adopting an ILP approach. 
Collaboration and the sharing of information and 
intelligence are critical to the success of ILP and, 
more importantly, the 3i model. Government 
should undertake to explore ILP as a means to 
address corruption and crime in general. The 
various statutory bodies and organisations tasked 
with addressing corruption in South Africa remain 
predominantly reactive. It is against this backdrop 
that a corruption intelligence centre would be 
a great asset. The centre would need to be a 
legally constituted body, similar to the Financial 
Intelligence Centre, where information related to 
corruption is collected from different organisations, 
then processed, analysed and interpreted. Staffed 
with intelligence analysts and supported by 
sophisticated IT software, the centre could provide 
intelligence on corruption to various investigative and 
enforcement agencies to assist in the identification 
and prosecution of perpetrators, and in so doing 
hopefully reduce corruption in South Africa.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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